Traders assign a 96.2% probability to no full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan by the end of 2026 primarily because the remaining timeframe is too short for observable large-scale amphibious mobilization, logistics surges, or command restructuring required for such an operation. Recent months have featured continued gray-zone coercion through PLA live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait, routine ADIZ incursions, and coast guard activities, alongside Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercises testing reservist mobilization, supply resilience, and communications. U.S. intelligence assessments, including the March 2026 ODNI report, indicate Beijing currently favors diplomatic and political pressure ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 elections rather than kinetic action, with no fixed unification timeline. Xi Jinping has reiterated reunification goals while focusing on cross-strait integration efforts. Late shifts remain possible via miscalculation in ongoing drills or abrupt policy changes, though structural readiness gaps and expected costs from external intervention make these unlikely before year-end.