The Iranian regime's institutional continuity and demonstrated resilience after the February 2026 leadership transition and subsequent military exchanges with Israel and the United States underpin trader expectations that it will not fall by September 30. Succession mechanisms activated rapidly under the Assembly of Experts, with Mojtaba Khamenei installed as supreme leader, while security forces maintained cohesion without large-scale defections amid prior protests and economic strain. Recent diplomatic efforts, including ceasefires and memoranda through mid-2026, have shifted focus toward de-escalation rather than internal fracture. In the narrow remaining window, significant barriers include the absence of coordinated elite defections or sustained nationwide unrest capable of toppling the system. Late developments such as renewed elite power struggles, sudden mass protests, or major external shocks could still shift assessments, though historical patterns of regime adaptation make rapid collapse improbable.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime iranien tombera-t-il d'ici le 30 septembre ?
Oui
$1,962,005 Vol.
$1,962,005 Vol.
Oui
$1,962,005 Vol.
$1,962,005 Vol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Résolveur
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Résolveur
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's institutional continuity and demonstrated resilience after the February 2026 leadership transition and subsequent military exchanges with Israel and the United States underpin trader expectations that it will not fall by September 30. Succession mechanisms activated rapidly under the Assembly of Experts, with Mojtaba Khamenei installed as supreme leader, while security forces maintained cohesion without large-scale defections amid prior protests and economic strain. Recent diplomatic efforts, including ceasefires and memoranda through mid-2026, have shifted focus toward de-escalation rather than internal fracture. In the narrow remaining window, significant barriers include the absence of coordinated elite defections or sustained nationwide unrest capable of toppling the system. Late developments such as renewed elite power struggles, sudden mass protests, or major external shocks could still shift assessments, though historical patterns of regime adaptation make rapid collapse improbable.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour


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