Taiwan’s ongoing Han Kuang defense exercises in August 2026, featuring the largest reservist mobilization to date and tests of supply-chain resilience and communications under simulated attack, underscore Taipei’s focus on deterrence and preparedness amid continued PRC gray-zone pressure. Beijing’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait followed Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s sovereignty statements, yet remained limited to signaling rather than escalation. Traders assign the 92.8% probability to “No” because these patterns of military posturing, diplomatic maneuvering ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 election cycle, and absence of amphibious or blockade operations align with historical precedent of managed tensions short of direct clash through the end of 2026. Scheduled exercises and official statements continue to shape the near-term outlook without altering the low assessed risk of open conflict.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · AggiornatoSì
7% probabilità
$3,219,323 Vol.
$3,219,323 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sì
7% probabilità
$3,219,323 Vol.
$3,219,323 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Taiwan’s ongoing Han Kuang defense exercises in August 2026, featuring the largest reservist mobilization to date and tests of supply-chain resilience and communications under simulated attack, underscore Taipei’s focus on deterrence and preparedness amid continued PRC gray-zone pressure. Beijing’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait followed Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s sovereignty statements, yet remained limited to signaling rather than escalation. Traders assign the 92.8% probability to “No” because these patterns of military posturing, diplomatic maneuvering ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 election cycle, and absence of amphibious or blockade operations align with historical precedent of managed tensions short of direct clash through the end of 2026. Scheduled exercises and official statements continue to shape the near-term outlook without altering the low assessed risk of open conflict.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercato aperto: Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
Volume
$3,219,323Data di fine
31 dic 2026Mercato aperto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Taiwan’s ongoing Han Kuang defense exercises in August 2026, featuring the largest reservist mobilization to date and tests of supply-chain resilience and communications under simulated attack, underscore Taipei’s focus on deterrence and preparedness amid continued PRC gray-zone pressure. Beijing’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait followed Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s sovereignty statements, yet remained limited to signaling rather than escalation. Traders assign the 92.8% probability to “No” because these patterns of military posturing, diplomatic maneuvering ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 election cycle, and absence of amphibious or blockade operations align with historical precedent of managed tensions short of direct clash through the end of 2026. Scheduled exercises and official statements continue to shape the near-term outlook without altering the low assessed risk of open conflict.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$3,219,323Data di fine
31 dic 2026Mercato aperto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Taiwan’s ongoing Han Kuang defense exercises in August 2026, featuring the largest reservist mobilization to date and tests of supply-chain resilience and communications under simulated attack, underscore Taipei’s focus on deterrence and preparedness amid continued PRC gray-zone pressure. Beijing’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait followed Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s sovereignty statements, yet remained limited to signaling rather than escalation. Traders assign the 92.8% probability to “No” because these patterns of military posturing, diplomatic maneuvering ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 election cycle, and absence of amphibious or blockade operations align with historical precedent of managed tensions short of direct clash through the end of 2026. Scheduled exercises and official statements continue to shape the near-term outlook without altering the low assessed risk of open conflict.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato
Fai attenzione ai link esterni.
Fai attenzione ai link esterni.
Domande frequenti