The 89% "No" probability on the Cuban regime falling by December 31, 2026, reflects trader assessment of the Communist Party of Cuba's institutional resilience under Miguel Díaz-Canel despite acute pressure. Intensified U.S. sanctions and a fuel blockade since January 2026 triggered nationwide blackouts and shortages, yet the government maintained control through localized protests, prisoner releases, and elite cohesion around the military-linked economic apparatus. In June, the National Assembly approved sweeping structural economic reforms to bolster domestic capacity, signaling adaptive capacity without core political change. Weak, fragmented opposition and the absence of coordinated mass mobilization or external military triggers further support continuity through year-end.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
11% 確率
$1,614,930 Vol.
$1,614,930 Vol.
2026/12/31
はい
11% 確率
$1,614,930 Vol.
$1,614,930 Vol.
2026/12/31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The 89% "No" probability on the Cuban regime falling by December 31, 2026, reflects trader assessment of the Communist Party of Cuba's institutional resilience under Miguel Díaz-Canel despite acute pressure. Intensified U.S. sanctions and a fuel blockade since January 2026 triggered nationwide blackouts and shortages, yet the government maintained control through localized protests, prisoner releases, and elite cohesion around the military-linked economic apparatus. In June, the National Assembly approved sweeping structural economic reforms to bolster domestic capacity, signaling adaptive capacity without core political change. Weak, fragmented opposition and the absence of coordinated mass mobilization or external military triggers further support continuity through year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
マーケット開始日： Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
音量
$1,614,930終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The 89% "No" probability on the Cuban regime falling by December 31, 2026, reflects trader assessment of the Communist Party of Cuba's institutional resilience under Miguel Díaz-Canel despite acute pressure. Intensified U.S. sanctions and a fuel blockade since January 2026 triggered nationwide blackouts and shortages, yet the government maintained control through localized protests, prisoner releases, and elite cohesion around the military-linked economic apparatus. In June, the National Assembly approved sweeping structural economic reforms to bolster domestic capacity, signaling adaptive capacity without core political change. Weak, fragmented opposition and the absence of coordinated mass mobilization or external military triggers further support continuity through year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
音量
$1,614,930終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...The 89% "No" probability on the Cuban regime falling by December 31, 2026, reflects trader assessment of the Communist Party of Cuba's institutional resilience under Miguel Díaz-Canel despite acute pressure. Intensified U.S. sanctions and a fuel blockade since January 2026 triggered nationwide blackouts and shortages, yet the government maintained control through localized protests, prisoner releases, and elite cohesion around the military-linked economic apparatus. In June, the National Assembly approved sweeping structural economic reforms to bolster domestic capacity, signaling adaptive capacity without core political change. Weak, fragmented opposition and the absence of coordinated mass mobilization or external military triggers further support continuity through year-end.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日
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