US sanctions and a fuel blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, have intensified Cuba’s economic crisis, triggering blackouts, shortages, and localized protests. The Communist Party under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained de facto control through expanded repression, a June package of economic reforms to attract investment, prisoner releases as diplomatic signals, and cohesion within security institutions. High-level bilateral negotiations continue, with the Trump administration pursuing insider arrangements for policy shifts rather than outright institutional overthrow. These factors, combined with the regime’s historical endurance under external pressure, underpin trader consensus reflected in the 88.5% “No” probability that the Communist Party will lose governing authority by December 31, 2026.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于是
12% 概率
$1,615,246 交易量
$1,615,246 交易量
2026-12-31
是
12% 概率
$1,615,246 交易量
$1,615,246 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
US sanctions and a fuel blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, have intensified Cuba’s economic crisis, triggering blackouts, shortages, and localized protests. The Communist Party under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained de facto control through expanded repression, a June package of economic reforms to attract investment, prisoner releases as diplomatic signals, and cohesion within security institutions. High-level bilateral negotiations continue, with the Trump administration pursuing insider arrangements for policy shifts rather than outright institutional overthrow. These factors, combined with the regime’s historical endurance under external pressure, underpin trader consensus reflected in the 88.5% “No” probability that the Communist Party will lose governing authority by December 31, 2026.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市场开放时间： Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
交易量
$1,615,246结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
US sanctions and a fuel blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, have intensified Cuba’s economic crisis, triggering blackouts, shortages, and localized protests. The Communist Party under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained de facto control through expanded repression, a June package of economic reforms to attract investment, prisoner releases as diplomatic signals, and cohesion within security institutions. High-level bilateral negotiations continue, with the Trump administration pursuing insider arrangements for policy shifts rather than outright institutional overthrow. These factors, combined with the regime’s historical endurance under external pressure, underpin trader consensus reflected in the 88.5% “No” probability that the Communist Party will lose governing authority by December 31, 2026.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$1,615,246结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...US sanctions and a fuel blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, have intensified Cuba’s economic crisis, triggering blackouts, shortages, and localized protests. The Communist Party under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained de facto control through expanded repression, a June package of economic reforms to attract investment, prisoner releases as diplomatic signals, and cohesion within security institutions. High-level bilateral negotiations continue, with the Trump administration pursuing insider arrangements for policy shifts rather than outright institutional overthrow. These factors, combined with the regime’s historical endurance under external pressure, underpin trader consensus reflected in the 88.5% “No” probability that the Communist Party will lose governing authority by December 31, 2026.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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